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Introduction
Since the end of the 2° World War up to the mid-70s, means-tested transfers have been the main form of income support mechanism in most Western countries. Abstracting from lots of details and variations in eligibility criteria, level of generosity, population coverage etc., those policies adopted mechanisms that in this paper -in a stylized representation -we will call Conditional Basic Income (CBI), where incomes below a certain threshold are -somehow -subsidized to the threshold.
1 For incomes below the threshold, a marginal tax rate close to (and sometimes greater than) 100% is applied. This introduces a disincentive to work, especially so for people with a low wage rate. The phenomena of poverty trap, or welfare trap, or welfare dependence have been observed -and to an increasing degree -in many countries. Welfare policies based on CBI-type mechanisms have also been criticized for other possible problems: high transaction costs and "welfare stigma" effects leading to low take-up rates, incentives to unde-reporting of income, errors in setting eligibility, litigation costs etc. (e.g. Friedman and Friedman 1980; Atkinson 2015) . Since the second half of the 70s, also as a response to the problems mentioned above, various reforms have been implemented in many countries: work-fare programs, less generous transfers, policies targeted towards smaller segments of the population, more sophisticated design of eligibility conditions and of the timing of transfers, in-work benefits or tax credits in order to strengthen the incentives to work (e.g. Blank et al. 1999) . On the one hand, the reforms have been successful with regards to work participation incentives. On the other hand, they might have increased the administration and transaction costs of the mechanisms and -to a certain extemt -also the direct cost when it comes to in-work-benefits or tax credits. Moreover, more complex conditioning and eligibility criteria might paradoxically induce more effort in trying to overcome the hurdles that limit the access to the policy, rather than in trying to find a job or a better one, thus encouraging a waste of potentially productive resources. During the last two decades, three processes have contributed to put the current welfare policies under stress and possibly to worsen their intrinsic drawbacks. Globalization and technological progress (automation), while creating big aggregate benefits, also imply massive adjustments in re-allocation of physical and human resources. Job losses and skill destruction and an increased demand for income support interventions-at least in the short-medium term -are natural consequences. The "Big Crisis" of the last decade obviously worsened the scenario. More recently, in many countries, a new interest emerged for a reform direction somehow opposed to the one taken since the end of 70s: less conditioning, simpler designs and ultimately some form of Unconditional Basic Income (UBI), i.e. a policy based on non-means tested trasfers (e.g. Atkinson 2015 , Colombino 2015b , Sommer 2016 , Standing 2008 , van Parijs 1995 . In a similar prspective, proposals have been put forward for universal share of GDP (Shiller 1998 , Raj 2016 or of the revenue from "common resources" (as it is actually implemented by the Alaska Permanent Fund).
Experiments have been done, among others, in India (Standing 2015) , Kenia (Haushofer & Shapiro 2016) and Uganda (Blattman et. 2014 ) with promising results. Experiments are currently being discussed (in the Netherlands) and actually run (in Finland, KELA 2016) . Other experiments are planned, e.g. one by the hi-tech incubator Ycombinator in the USA. Although the idea goes back to a philosophical tradition focusing on ethical-distributive criteria (van Parijs 1995) , from the strict economic point-of-view UBI might be particularly interesting for its possible efficiency properties. It must be noted at this point that both CBI and UBI are members of a more general class: the Negative Income Tax (NIT). The NIT was originally proposed by Friedman (1962) as an incentive-improving mechanism with respect to CBI-like policies. It consists of applying a lower-than-100% marginal withdrawal rate (MWR) to the basic transfer. In the limit, if the MWR is close to the first MTR applied to incomes above the subsidised level, the policy becomes indistinguishable from UBI. Thus we have a whole class of income support mechanisms (NIT) that ranges from one extreme (CBI) to the other (UBI), where each member of the class is characterized by the degree of means-testing (i.e. the value of the MWR). Another idea pointing towards simplification, which is often associated with NIT-like income support mechanisms, is the socalled Flat-Tax (FT), i.e. a proportional tax applied to all personal incomes above an exemption level (e.g. Hall and Rabushka 1995, Atkinson 1996) . Despite the proportional marginal tax rate, the whole system is progressive in the sense that -due to the exemption level or to the guaranteed minimum income -the average tax rate increases with income. Overall, the "package" NIT+FT , besides being simple and transparent might provide a good equilibrium between progressivity, labour incentives and administration costs.
In what follows, we adopt an empirical optinal taxation perspective in order to scan the NIT+FT class and its special cases for the best (social-welfare-wise) policies and compare them to the current taxtransfer systems in six European countries.
4
The alternative policies
All the income-support mechanism that we consider below are matched with a FT. Overall we consider very stylized tax-transfer rules. On the one hand, they can be seen as simplified representation of the rules that are, or might be, actually implemented. On the other hand, they might be viewed as reforms in the direction of simplification. A Conditional Basic Income (CBI) mechanism essentially works as follows ( Figure 1a ). There is a threshold G, the guaranteed minimum income. If your own ( This mechanism suffers from the "welfare trap" or "welfare dependence" problem: there is no incentive to work for an income lower than G. But even a job paying more than G might not be convenient when accounting for hours to be spent on the job rather than devoted to leisure. 2 How strong is this effect 5 depends of course on G, on the wage you can command on the labour market, on your relative preferences for income vs leisure etc.
The Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) mechanism is illustrated in Figure 1b . It consists of an unconditional transfer G to everyone (every citizen, say). The amount G would typically be lower than with CBI. Net available income would be G + (1 -t)Y, where again we assume a FT rate t. As noted with CBI, also UBI can be intertpreted or implemented in a different way. Above an "exemption level" G/t, the amount (Y-G/t) is taxed at a marginal rate t. Below the exemption level, there is a transfer equal to (G -tY). The two alternatives obviously imply the same budget constraint in a static scenario. However, they might imply some differences in an intertemporal scenario. For example, with uncertainty and imperfect credit markets, it makes a difference to receive G upfront (say at the beginning of the year) or to receive a means tested transfer (say at the end of the year).
Clearly, with UBI: (i) there is no welfare trap, since even starting from Y = 0 for every euro of earnings you get (1 -t) euros; (ii) there is no incentive to under-report income or employment status, since you receive G whatever your income or your employment status is; (iii) there is no "stigma" or marginalization effect, since everyone receives the transfer; (iv) administration costs are relatively low;
it has been estimated that the administrative costs of conditional transfer can be up to four times larger than the administrative costs of an equal unconditional transfer (de Walle 1999) . More in general,
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according to some analysts, UBI might represent a viable alternative to the prevailing current policies in order to help reallocating jobs and resources in the globalized and progressively automated economy, where employers need flexibility to compete on a global scale and employees need support to redesign their careers and occupational choices (e.g. Standing 2008 , Colombino 2015a , Raj 2016 . Experimental evidence suggests that UBI might reduce risk-aversion and therefore promote entrepreneurial activities and investment in human capital (Blatman 2014). Although a lump-sum transfer equal for everyone might appear as "unfair" or "wasteful" , this negative perception is not justified: even with a flat tax rate t, the average (net) tax rate increases with income, due to the transfer G (a negative tax); from a different perspective, since everyone pays taxes (1-t)Y, the lump-sum transfer G is progressively "given back" up to the break-even point G/t. UBI has its own difficulties. It is going to be more expensive than CBI; if, and how much, more expensive depends on the respective amounts of the transfers G; it also depends on how much UBI allows to save on administration costs. Although welfare trap effects are absent, there is however an income effect (due to the transfer G) with possible negative effects on labour supply. However, the experimental evidence available so far suggests small negative effects and in some cases even positive effects.
As noted in the Introduction, both CBI and UBI can be interpreted as special cases of a general mechanism known as Negative Income Tax (NIT). As we have seen when discussing CBI and UBI, there are two possible interpretations of NIT-like mechenisms. The first one goes as follows. You receive an unconditional transfer G. Then your own income Y is taxed according to a rate t1, up to Y = G/t1. The aditional income (if any) Y-G/t1 is taxed according to a tax rate t2. In a second interpretation, G/t1 is defined as the exemption level; below the exemption level, you receive a transfer equal to G -t1Y. In the original proposal made by Friedman (1962) , t1 is larger than t2, (convex profile of the tax-transfer rule) but in general it needs not to be. If t1< t2 we get a concave profile. If t1 = t2, we get the UBI rule. If t2 < t1 = 1, we get a CBI rule. Intermediate cases generate a variety of incentives configurations. Figure 1c represents two possible intermediate versions of the NIT mechanism. The NIT class can also be generalized to include in-work benefits (IWB) or tax credits. where for a range of low gross incomes the marginal tax rate is negative, e.g. the net wage rate is larger than the gross wage rate. This mechanism has become popular in the last decades especialy in view of improving incentives to work (e.g. Moffit 2003 , Blank et al. 1999 ). Optimal Taxation concerns the question of how tax-transfers rules should be design in order to maximise a social welfare function subject to the public revenue constraint. We depart from the approach of computing optimal policies using theoretical formulas with imputed or calibrated parameters, as many authors have done, e.g. using the results of Mirrlees (1971) or the more recent ones by Saez (2001 Saez ( , 2002 .
The background of our analysis is represented by a series of papers where a microeconometric-numerical approach to optimal taxation is adopted. Aaberge and Colombino (2006, 20013) identify optimal taxes for Norway within the class of 9-parameter piece-wise linear tax-transfer rules. Aaberge and Colombino (2012) perform a similar exercise for Italy. Aaberge and Flood (2008) study the design of tax-credit policies in Sweden. Colombino et al. (2010) study the design of income support mechanisms in various European countries Blundell and Shepard (2012) focus on the optimal tax-transfer systems for lone mother in the UK. 3 Our methodology is based on two steps. First, we estimate a microeconometric model of household labour supply for six countries from different European areas. The specification of the models permits more flexibility as compared to the typical assumptions made in Optimal Taxation theory.
Second, given a certain class of tax-transfer rules, we iteratively run the models in order to identify the optimal rule belonging to that class. In order to identify optimal policies we consider four types that belong to the NIT class: Conditional basic Income (CBI), Unconditional basic Income (UBI), In Work Benefit (IWB), and General Negative Income Tax (GNIT). With GNIT we mean a NIT scheme where t1 and t2 are unconstrained, differently from CBI, UBI and IWB that belong to the NIT class but are defined by some constraints on t1 and t2. The members of each type are defined by a policy-specific vector of parameters :
 πCBI = (G, t1, t2), with t1 = 1, πUBI = (G, t1, t2), with t1 = t2, πIWB = (G, t1, t2, ) with t1 < 0, πGNIT = (G, t1,, t2, ) with no constraints on (t1, t2), where G is adjusted according to the household size (square root rule).
The policies replace the whole tax-benefit system. The public budget constraint requires that the "net revenue" is the same as under the current regime. We define net revenue = taxes -transfers, where taxes = income taxes + employee's social security contributions. In terms of the parametric definition of the policies given above, we require thet the following constraint be satisfied:
revenue collected through the tax rates (t1, t2) -G = current net revenue.
We define (Section 4.3) the comparable money-metric utility index μi(π) for each household and the Social Welfare function W(μ1(π), …, μN(π)). The optimal tax-trasfer rule π* for a given type (UBI, CBI etc.) is then defined as:
s.t. public budget constraint is satisfied. The maximization of W is performed with an iterative procedure explained in Section 4.5.
Note that GNIT is by definition more general than the other NIT special cases. Therefore GNIT must be at least as good as the special cases. Yet it is important to define the optimal design of the special cases: although necessarily not superior to GNIT according to the Social Welfare criterion, they might be more attractive than GNIT according to other dimensions that are not taken into account by the Social Welfare function. 
where:
γ and λ are parameters to be estimated;
π is a vector including household disposable income on a (h,s) job given the tax-benefit parameters π , its square and its interaction with the household size; Li(h) is a row vector including the leisure time (defined as the total number of available weekly hours (80) minus the hours of work h) for both partners, its square and the interaction with household disposable income, age (and age square), presence of children of different age range (i.e. >0, 0-6, 7-10);
 is a random variable that accounts for the effect of unobserved (by the analyst) characteristics. A (h,s) job is "available" to household i with p.d.f. ( , ) i f h s , which we call "opportunity density".
We estimate the labour supply models of couples and singles separately. In the case of singles, we have 7 alternatives, while in the case of couples, who make joint labour-supply decision, we combine the choice alternatives of two partners, thus getting 49 alternatives.
When computing the salary of any particular job (h, s) we face the problem that the wage rates of sector s are observed only for those who work in sector s. Moreover, for individuals who are not working we do not observe any wage rate. To deal with this issue, we follow a two-stage procedure presented in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and also adopted in Coda- Moscarola et al. (2014) .
By assuming the  is i.i.d. Type I extreme value and choosing a conveniente specification of the opportunity density we obtain the following expression for the probability that household i holds a (h,s)
job (e.g. see Colombino 2013 , Coda Moscarola et al. 2014 ): 
. 
Second, we calculate the CMU of household i
under tax regime . It is defined as the gross (full) income that a reference household under a reference tax-transfer regime 0  would nead in order to attain an expected maximum utility equal to
The reference tax-transfer regime is a FT with 4 EUROMOD is a large-scale pan-European tax-benefit static micro-simulation engine (e.g. Sutherland and Figari, 2013) . This large-scale income calculator incorporates the tax-benefit schemes of the majority of European countries and allows computation of predicted household disposable income, on the basis of gross earnings, employment and other household characteristics. 5 The CMU is analogous to the "equivalent income" defined by King (1983) . A discussion of this type of money-metric measures is provided by Fleurbeay (2011) . Although the choice of the reference household is essentially arbitrary, some choices make more sense than others. Fleurbeay (2011) presents some exambles that can be motivated by ethical criteria. Decoster and Haan (2015) provide an empirical appilcations of Fleubeay's ethical criteria. Our choice of the median household as reference household can be justified in terms of representativeness or centrality of its preferences. Colombino (2006, 2013) adopt a related, although not identical, procedure that consists of using a common utility fuction as argument of the social welfare function (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980) .
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G=0 (subject to the public budget constraint). The reference household is the couple household at the median value of the distribution of
Social Welfare function
We choose Kolm ( 1976) Social Welfare index, which can be defined as:  from individual 2 in order to give to individual 1. Since
(approximately) the "excess willingness to pay" for a "inequality reducing" transfer from individual 2 to Kolm Inequality Index is an absolute index, meaning that it is invariant with respect to translations (i.e.
to adding a constant to every μi). Absolute indexes are less popular than relative indexes (e.g. Gini's or Atkinsos's), although there is no strict logical or economical motivation for preferring one rather than the other. 7 Blundell and Shephard (2012) adopt a social welfare index which turns out to be very close to Kolm's. Their main motivation for their index seems to be the computational convenience, since it handles negative numbers (random utility levels, in their case). Our motivation in choosing Kolm's index is analogous. In our case, μi is a monetary measure, yet it can happen to be negative when the utility level of household i is very far from the utility level of the reference household. Kolm's index handles negative arguments. Alternatively, it ia also possible to shift the μi-s by adding a constant (which would not be allowed with a relative index).
Identifying the optimal policies
The maximization of W is performed numerically. It is important to keep in mind that the simulated policies differ from the current policies with respect to many dimensions. First, we simulate policies with a FT, while all the countries included in the present exercise adopt increasing marginal tax rates. Second, all the simulated policies are universal and permanent, i.e. identically applied to all the citizens, while the current systems are somehow categorical, adopt some sort of tagging and more or less complex eligibility rule, time-dependent treatments etc. In general, while the current systems might be somehow close to CBI or IWB or other versions of NIT-like mechanism, they are much more complicated. The comparison of the reforms to the current system is informative upon the effects of the reformed budget sets, including the effects of the universal and permanent extention to the whole population. It is not directly informative upon dimensions -such as the administration costs -which are not represented in our microeconometric model. However, since we measure social welfare effects in money-metric terms, in principle it might be possible to also account for those so far unaccounted dimensions. If we can obtain an estimate of the change in, say, administration costs implied by a refom, then we can incorporate that estimate into the money-metric social welfare evaluation of the reform.
Results
The main results of the exercise illustrated in Section 4 are summarized in Tables B1 -B6 (Appendix B) and in Graphs C1 -C6 (Appendix C).
The Tables -one for There is a large variability of G, across both the policies and the countries. The literature typically represents GNIT with t1 > t2. Instead, for five out of six countries we get t1 < t2, France being the exeption. Our result seems to be driven by the fact that the disincentive effect of high marginal tax rates is stronger for low-income households than for high-income households. A major concern regarding universalistic income support policies is the effect on labour supply. One might expect a reduction of labour supply both for an income effect (higher unearned income) and for a substitution effect (higher taxes required for financing the policies. With the exemption of IWB (which is indeed typically adopted with the main purpose of encouraging labour suppy), in most countries and for most policies we observe indeed a reduction of hours worked, although not so large to be considered a matter of concern. It may also happen that the optimal level of G is less generous (at least for part of the population) than the current transfers, the implication being an increase of labour supply with policies different from IWB. This is the case with CBI in France and Luxembourg. As with labour supply, what happens to the poverty rate is the result of many effects that contribute differently between the policies and between the countries.
There is a "mechanical" effect due to G (which however may be more or less generous that the replaced transfers). There is an incentive effect that lead some household to remain below the poverty line depending on the level of G and on the MWR. There are also other incentive effects that depend on the MTRs. Most policies in most countries lead to a majority of winners, the exceptions being CBI in Ireland and IWB in the UK and in Ireland.
The change in Social Welfare, since it is expressed as percentage of average household income, as explained above, can be interpreted as equivalent to a percentage (permanent) change of GDP. Under this criterion, the countries that might benefit more for adopting the optimal GNIT tax-transfer rule are the UK (+9.06%) and Ireland +(3.99%). More modest gains should be expected in France (+1.70%), Belgium (+1.51%) and Italy (+0.93%). The extreme case is represented by Luxembourg, where the adoption of the optimal GNIT would bring about a gain equal 0.1%.
The Graphs show -for the six countries -the location of the optimal policies in the space (-Inequality, Efficiency). Social Welfare ( = Efficiency -Inequality) increases towards North-Est. The Graphs also show the Iso-Social Welfare lines passing through the points that represent the current regime and the best optimal regime. The Graphs are useful for visualizing the Social Welfare distance between the various policies and the two components (Efficiency and -Inequality) of Social Welfare.
As expected, in all the countries GNIT (the unconstrained vesion of NIT) dominates the constrained versions of NIT: BCI, UBI and IWB. What's more striking is that in all the countries GNIT dominates the current tax-transfer rule.
The rankings of the policies varies a lot among the six countries. In most cases (Belgium, Ireland, Italy
Luxembourg and United Kingdom) UBI is second-best after GNIT. The current regime is dominated by at least two alternative policies in most countries: a notable exception is Luxembourg where the current regime is second-best (together with UBI) and however very close to the first-best GNIT.
The Social Welfare performance of CBI and IWB -the most popular schemes actually implemented currently -is, in general, poor, with the exception of France, where CBI is second-best after GNIT.
Using a flexible microeconometric model to simulate household behaviour permits to drop the restrictive assumptions adopted in the traditional approach and allows for a richer and more realistic representation of preferences and opportunities. Using microsimulation combined with numerical methods permits to identify the optimal policies with no need for explicit analytical solutions of complex optimization problems. The new approach leads to the identification of optimal policies that are less assumption-driven (with respect to the traditional approach) and therefor better fitted to the country-specific charcteristics.
Conclusions
We present an exercise in empirical optimal taxation for European countries from three areas: Southern, supporting a NIT+FT as a promising reform for European countries, especially -due to the simplicity of the NIT+FT rule -in the perspective of implementing a common type of tax-transfer rule. The optimal tax-transfer parameters of all the policies present very large variations from one country to the other. On the one hand, this confirms the added value of our approach (based on a flexible microeconometric models, on rich datasets and on numerical optimization) with respect to the traditional empirical optimal taxation exercises (based on imputed or calibrated parameters and on analytical maximization). On the other hand, the variance of results calls for an analysis of how the optimal tax-transfer parameters depends on the "deep" characteristic, or the "primitives" of the different countries. This will be the focus of future work.
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Appendix A: 
